Tag Archives: Ivory Coast

#RtoPWeekly: 23-27 January 2017

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ICRtoP releases new infographic on the Responsibility to Protect in Peacekeeping Operations

infographic

The ICRtoP serves as a key resource to increase understanding of the Responsibility to Protect amongst civil society, government and regional organization actors, the UN, and the general public. Our vast range of educational tools has been used by diverse audiences throughout the world and has had a direct impact on strengthening the global awareness of RtoP.

To contribute towards this goal of strengthening awareness of and action on atrocity prevention, the ICRtoP regularly releases a variety of educational tools exploring the different aspects of the norm and the relationship between RtoP and other sectors. In this vein, ICRtoP has released a new infographic on the Responsibility to Protect in Peacekeeping Operations.

This document provides an overview of the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians mandates in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) throughout the world. The educational tool also explores major peacekeeping roles that contribute to operationalizing the norm and methods for strengthening RtoP within PKOs.

To view the latest infographic on the Responsibility to Protect in Peacekeeping Operations, please click here.

To view all of ICRtoP’s educational tools, please click here.


Catch up on developments in…

Burma/Myanmar
Burundi
CAR
Cote d’Ivoire
DRC
Iraq
Libya
Mali
Nigeria
South Sudan
Sudan/Darfur
Syria
Yemen


Burma/Myanmar:

UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma, Yanghee Lee, expressed concern about the risk of government reprisals in a speech following the conclusion of her trip to the country on Friday. Lee also noted the many travel restrictions placed on her during her visit that interfered with her investigation.

The Burmese army has claimed to have two missing Kachin church leaders alive in custody. Human Rights Watch (HRW) called on the Burmese authorities to either release or charge two detained church leaders and to allow for proper legal procedures.

The army reportedly seized a camp of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an armed ethnic faction and member of the Northern Alliance coalition, continuing the ongoing clashes with the group. Large military supply convoys were also reportedly deployed to the northern Kachin region, indicating a potential for a renewed offensive against the factions in the contested north.

The Peace Process Steering Committee (PPST) delegation, representing the eight factions that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015, met with State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Chief Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing on Monday to discuss groundwork for the second round of the Union Peace Conference, including the potential ability to include the Northern Alliance in negotiations. The delegation leader for the PPST also called on both the State Counsellor and the army chief to halt military operations and declare a ceasefire north, where the clashes have resulted in numerous military and civilian casualties.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has suggested that the government, lead by The National League for Democracy (NLD) party, should seek to amend or repeal laws that criminalize nonviolent speech. During the government’s first year there has been an escalation in prosecutions of peaceful political speech and speech monitoring has become significantly more aggressive. The government has reportedly continued the repression of the population through refused bail, months-long detentions pending trial, and the sentencing of citizens to excessive jail time for political speech.

On Wednesday, 22 non-governmental organizations called for immediate cessation of armed conflict, protection and safety of displaced citizens, and a dialogue of peace in Burma. In a press release, these organizations expressed concern for the escalating conflict and mass displacement in the country, particularly in the Kachin and Northern Shan States. Dire living conditions and lack of humanitarian aid plague more than 6,000 already displaced in camps, while an additional 5,600 have recently been displaced.


Burundi:

President Pierre Nkurunziza has pardoned 300 of Burundi’s prisoners as part of the government’s plan to release 25 percent of the Mpimba central prison inmates, totaling a release of 2,500 prisoners. However, human rights groups have voiced concern that this pardon is simply to make room for victims of arbitrary arrests, adding to the repression of Burundi’s citizens.


Central African Republic:

New reports have shown that the Central African Republic has become the most dangerous country for aid workers over the past year, with 365 security incidents in 2016. The International NGO Safety Organization recorded 27 injuries in attacks against aid workers last year and five deaths of humanitarian aid workers. They reports also shows no sign of improvement, with the security situation likely to deteriorate even more. In addition, hospitals and other areas for the provision of humanitarian assistance have repeatedly been attacked.


Cote d’Ivoire:

The UN independent expert on capacity building and operations for Côte d’Ivoire examined the challenges facing the country, looking ahead to the imminent withdrawal of United Nations Operation of Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in a statement on Friday. Mr. Mohammed Ayat called for vigilance to preserve and strengthen the country’s security and stability, political dialogue, transitional justice, and human rights situation. He specifically called upon Ivorian authorities to reform the security sector and strengthen institutions for peace and good governance.


Democratic Republic of Congo:

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) declared its intent to work on resolving the increasing violence caused by conflict between farmers, the government, armed groups, and nomadic herders in search of pasture for their cattle.

Bishops leading the negotiations between rival leaders in the DRC have said they are confident all stakeholders will ratify the agreement by 28 January. However, they also warned that unless the deal from 31 December is signed by that date, their efforts for peace in the country will have been in vain.


Iraq:

Iraqi forces declared that they have retaken control of eastern Mosul from the Islamic State (ISIL) on Tuesday. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister has ordered investigations into violations of human rights and other abuses purportedly committed by government troops and paramilitary forces in the battle to retake the city. The order came after a UN demand for a government probe into a video reportedly showing brutal treatment and executions of at least three ISIL suspects taken prisoner in eastern Mosul.

In a report on Tuesday, Amnesty International claimed that the government of Iraq has executed 31 individuals for connections to a 2014 mass killing. The human rights monitor called the execution further proof of the government’s disregard of human rights in security efforts and alleged that the individuals were additionally victims of torture and a flawed judicial process. Mosul trauma care has been increased by the World Health Organization (WHO) and partners, but current funding levels are not enough to provide full services for the 2.7 million people affected


Libya:

US officials have announced that Libya has been removed from a list of combat zones where the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) rules to protect to civilians can be disregarded. Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria remain on the list.

Officials from neighboring countries met in Cairo this week with the UN envoy for Libya and rejected the use of military force to resolve the Libyan conflict. The leader of the UN-backed Government of National Accord announced on Wednesday that he will meet with the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Cairo. While talks will reportedly be unmediated, they may involve representatives from Russia. The forces of the LNA have reportedly clashed with militias supporting the UN-backed administration, leading some to analysts and diplomats to raise concerns regarding a potential re-escalation of the conflict. LNA forces have been the primary group in Libya combating Islamist groups, including the Islamic State (ISIL) and the LNA announced on Thursday that they had made ground against an al-Qaeda linked group in Benghazi.

Also in Benghazi on Thursday, a car bomb injured six. A bombing last Friday near a mosque also killed one civilian and injured 10 others.


Mali:

Pro-government militias have claimed that an attack by former rebels killed 14 on Saturday. Elements of a Tuareg-led former rebel group who had been part of a joint patrol on Wednesday reportedly carried out the attack on pro-government and other former rebel militias while they were preparing for a joint patrol as part of the terms of the peace deal.
On Tuesday, the UN announced that a mortar attack on a camp of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) killed one UN peacekeeper and wounded two others. In a press statement, the UN Security Council called on the Malian government to swiftly investigate the incident and bring the perpetrators to justice, emphasizing that such attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes in international law.  These attacks are reportedly part of an escalating trend in violence in the northern regions of the country driven by an expansion of extremist groups.


Nigeria:

On Saturday, the Indigenous People of Biafra claimed that police killed 20 people after a demonstration organized by a separatist group supporting the new US president and seeking his aid in establishing a breakaway Biafran state turned violent. The group also claimed that 200 people have gone missing. A police spokesperson denied that anyone had been killed, but did inform media that police arrested 65 people.

According to local officials, the total number of people killed in the purportedly accidental airstrike on an aid camp outside of the town Rann could be as high as 236. The regional security situation has only recently allowed humanitarian groups access to the area to help those fleeing the fighting between the government and Boko Haram terror group, however, only two days after the errant airstrike, a group of around 15 Boko Haram fighters attacked the town. Military officials have reported that a local garrison defending Rann killed all those fighters involved in the attack.


South Sudan:

On Monday, the UN Security Council called for the government of South Sudan to cooperate with the United Nations in the immediate deployment of a 4,000 strong regional protection force (RPF). The decision came after the government rescinded on its earlier acceptance of the force on 11 January. UN Secretary General Guterres has accused South Sudan of willfully hindering the deployment of the additional forces. Numerous voices have called on the UN Security Council to take immediate action in South Sudan to prevent the possibility of genocide. Former Deputy Defence Minister of South Sudan, Majak D’Agoot, has stated that the deployment of 4,000 additional troops, called for by UNSC resolution 2304 in August, was necessary given the delicate situation in the country and the warnings signs of a potential genocide. He also accused the political elite in Juba of interfering with the deployment to protect their own interests. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) responsible for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement has echoed calls for an accelerated deployment of the delayed RPF, citing similar concerns of the ethnically-fueled conflict collapsing into genocide.

The Director of Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Katherine Almquist Knopf, has also recommended a method of resolving the violence and risk of atrocities in South Sudan in a new report published by the Council of Foreign Relations. The report calls for the UN and African Union to cooperatively assume the responsibility to form an international transitional administration to allow the country to recover and stabilize.

On Tuesday, a UN spokesperson informed the media that the the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) had received credible reports of renewed fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the opposition in Central Equatoria over the weekend and of clashes in Eastern Equatoria. UNMISS is pursuing further information of civilians being killed in both instances. However, on Thursday, the South Sudanese government officially denied any clash between their forces and the opposition.

The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has stated in the December 2016 humanitarian access situation snapshot that 77 incidents hindering humanitarian access had occurred over the course of the month. 61 percent of such incidents involved violence against humanitarian personnel and assets, with 27 percent involving interference in implementation. The snapshot also reports of multiple situations where violent clashes forced aid workers to relocate, including one incident involving refugees and members of the host community that necessitated the relocation of 85 humanitarian personnel. It was also stated that the country had deported two senior aid workers and the country’s armed forces forcibly occupied two schools.


Sudan:

A breakaway faction of the Sudan Liberation Army rebel group signed a peace deal with the government in Doha on Monday. Officials of Qatar’s government and the head of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) were also in attendance.


Syria:

Peace talks between the Assad regime and rebel factions moderated by Russia and Turkey in the Kazakhstani capital of Astana began on Monday with a difficult start between the two sides of the conflict angrily insulting and challenging one another. It was later determined that the objectives of the meeting would not be full peace agreement, but rather a strengthening of the current ceasefire agreement in order to increase the likelihood of success at the UN-brokered peace conference in Geneva next month. According to a final statement read by the foreign minister of Kazakhstan following the talks, Russia, Iran, and Turkey have agreed on behalf of the Assad regime and rebel factions to establish a trilateral mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire agreement. While the representative for the regime hailed the talks as a success, neither side has formally endorsed the agreement and opposition forces have voiced major reservations.

Government forces have continued to besiege East Ghouta using a strategy not dissimilar to the one utilized in the seizure of Aleppo. However, civilians are reportedly refusing to abandon their homes and the city to the government, with medical centers reporting that nearly 20-30 people each day are treated for injuries caused by the continuous bombardment of the area. 300,000 people are still believed to be living in East Ghouta. The city is one of 39 besieged communities which have trapped more than 1.3 million people in combat zones. At least 400,000 civilians have been killed since 2011 when the uprising began according to statements by the UN.

US military officials have claimed that the final airstrike of the outgoing US administration landed in Syria on Thursday, allegedly killing roughly 100 al-Qaeda forces. Officials have also claimed they have a high level of confidence that the airstrike did not harm any civilians.


Yemen:

Government forces fighting their way up the western coast had mostly surrounded the contested Red Sea port city Mocha by Sunday. The city is suspected to be a source of arms for the Al Houthi rebel groups. An army spokesperson stated on Wednesday that the army was in the process of clearing the last of resistance snipers and landmines throughout the town. Retreating Houthi forces have allegedly continued to heavily mine the territories they once occupied. The army has reportedly made concerted efforts to carefully target combatants to avoid civilian casualties. However, Houthi sources have claimed that coalition airstrikes killed one civilian and wounded two others in Mocha as well as killing another elsewhere in the Taiz province and wounding three civilians in Saana over the weekend. On Tuesday, the reported lack of coordination between Yemeni ground forces and coalition air power resulted in a mistaken strike on Yemeni soldiers. Reports claim that the fighting in Yemen over the weekend killed a total of 75 people, including those killed by the first US drone strikes of the new administration.

The British Ministry of Defence is reportedly tracking 252 violations of international humanitarian law by Saudi-led coalition forces, but has declined to state if arms supplied by the United Kingdom were utilized in the alleged violations. The export of arms and munitions to Saudi Arabia by the UK has been criticized for potentially fueling the conflict and thereby worsening the suffering of Yemeni civilians.

UN Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrived in the capital on Sunday to continue to push for a new round of peace talks. Under the new peace plan, current President Hadi will retain presidential powers until the Houthis fully withdraw from all occupied territories and disarm. The government formally expressed objection to the UN Special Envoy meeting with Houthi militia leaders and their allies in the Houthi-occupied capital, Sanaa. Following his visits, the UN Special Envoy briefed the Security Council on the situation in Yemen and provided several recommendations, including an immediate and complete ceasefire, the disarmament and withdrawal of the Houthi faction from Sanaa, and adherence to the roadmap for peaceful settlement, which includes the appointment of a new Vice President.

 

 

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The RtoP and the ICC: Complementary in Prevention, Assistance and Response

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has delivered its first ever verdict with a finding of guilty in the case of the Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo on 14 March 2012.

In light of this, and with the ICC playing differing but integral roles in responding to mass atrocities in recent situations like Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, we’d like to expand on the relationship between the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the ICC. In this effort, we asked several ICRtoP member organizations, including the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Citizens for Justice and Accountability, the International Refugee Rights Initiative, and the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy to provide their reflections on the relationship.

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are two interconnected initiatives that seek to ensure that the world responds to mass atrocities and hold perpetrators of these egregious crimes accountable. At their core, however, the RtoP and the ICC are complementary in seeking to prevent these crimes from occurring altogether.

Both the RtoP and ICC articulate the primary responsibilities of states. The Rome Statute of the ICC provides that it is the primary responsibility of national authorities to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for the commission of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

George Kegoro, Executive Director of the Kenya Section – International Commission of Jurists, explains this further: “The ICC is a ‘court of last resort’ – that is, its mandate is to prosecute only when domestic avenues have been exhausted, and where a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute those individuals responsible for the gravest of crimes.”

Similarly, RtoP bestows the primary responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing – the four ‘RtoP crimes’ – to the state. As William Pace, the Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP), a founding Steering Committee Member of the ICRtoP and the Coalition for the ICC, notes, this synergy dates back to the march towards the creation of the ICC, as “RtoP emerged massively from the Rome Statute process – the same crimes, complementarity, national and international responsibility.”

However, as has been witnessed in countless situations, some states fail to uphold their obligations. In instances where states are willing but unable to protect populations, the second pillar of RtoP – international assistance and capacity-building – asserts that the United Nations (UN), its Member States, regional organizations, and civil society have a role to play in ensuring that those states receive the assistance necessary to assume their RtoP.

Similarly, the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC adopted a resolution at the May-June 2010 Kampala Review Conference which premised that the Court and its members, the States Parties to the Rome Statute, should provide the tools needed to assist states who were willing but unable to fulfill their Statute responsibilities. One such example of this was provided by Sulaiman Jabati, Executive Secretary of the Freetown, Sierra Leone-based Citizens for Justice and Accountability  (COJA), who said that the ICC should “expand its outreach activities in countries that have early warning signs for potential conflict.” In this sense, RtoP and the ICC are both complementary in calling for the provision for international assistance to ensure states uphold their primary responsibilities.

RtoP and the ICC are also complementary in instances where states are found both unable and unwilling to meet their responsibilities. The Rome Statute provides that when a state does not meet its primary obligations to prosecute individuals responsible for the commission of Statute crimes, it will ensure situations are investigated, warrants are issued, and those in its custody are prosecuted.

Similarly, when a state is found unable and unwilling to uphold its responsibility to protect civilians, the norm provides that the responsibility to protect those civilians yields to the UN and its Member States in cooperation with regional organizations.

Libya and Côte d’Ivoire: The ICC in the RtoP Toolkit

As the recent cases of Libya and Côte d’Ivoire have demonstrated, the Court is firmly engrained under RtoP’s third pillar – timely and decisive response – as a tool used to respond to situations where mass atrocities are threatened or have occurred, as well as to prevent further atrocities from being committed through deterrence.

In response to the situation in Libya, where the regime of the now-deceased Colonel Muammar Gaddafi committed widespread atrocities against civilian protesters beginning from 17 February onwards, the RtoP framework guided early and unprecedented action to avert further crimes against civilians. An ICC referral was one of the broad range of measures taken to halt the threat of crimes in this context.

On 26 February, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1970, in which it referred the Libyan case to the ICC and imposed other non-coercive measures to respond to the crackdown. Pace calls the Resolution 1970, “one of the finest ever of the UNSC, and the process leading to the 15-0 decision [result of the vote] among the best examples of how the international community should maintain international peace and security.”

The investigation that ensued resulted in the indictments of Muammar Gaddafi, his son, Saif Gaddafi, and former intelligence chief, Abdullah Senussi, which were announced by the Court while the conflict raged on. But, as Dismas Nkunda, Co-Director of the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), suggests, the indictments being made while Libya was in the midst of a conflict were problematic. “The arrest warrants before the fall of Gaddafi regime played into the discourse being propagated by the African Union,” states Nkunda, “that the ICC was more interested in trying African leaders,” than finding peace in the country.

Furthermore, Nkunda said the process raised serious concerns on the African continent about the independence of the ICC from the influence of the UNSC, particularly as, “the Libyan case was seen to be biased against one side of the conflict.” Disquiet over the impartiality of the Court has thus led to concerns over the selective application of the RtoP, Nkunda said, which may prove problematic for both the norm and the institution moving forward.

Despite these concerns, the Court remains actively involved in Libya. After Saif’s arrest in November 2011, the ICC has been engaged with Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) on the issue of his trial. It had been reported that the Court would allow Libya to try Gaddafi’s son, but as of 25 January 2012, no decision had yet to be made by the ICC.

As of November 2011, the Court remained involved in Libya as it continues to build its case against Saif Gaddafi and Senussi and investigates allegations that all parties to the conflict, including anti-Gaddafi forces, committed war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. The 2 March 2012 report of the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry into Libya, and its handing over of a list to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Navil Pillay, of suspected perpetrators, could mean continued involvement for the Court moving forward as well.

The Court also played an important role in the response to the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire between 28 November 2010 and 11 April 2011, during which widespread human rights violations and crimes against humanity were alleged to have been committed.

As the situation in the country intensified in March and April 2011, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC warned on 6 April that an investigation could be triggered as a result of reports of widespread and systematic killings. On 4 October 2011, in the aftermath of hostilities, the ICC exercised its jurisdiction in the country and authorized an investigation into allegations of such violations committed by all parties to the conflict.

Months after his arrest on 11 April 2011, on 30 November 2011 former President Laurent Gbagbo was transferred to the Court – the first head of state to be in the custody of the ICC – and will stand trial for his in alleged involvement in crimes against humanity over the course of the civil conflict. It was also announced on 22 February 2012 that the Court would expand the scope of its investigation into the country to the 2002-2010 period.

According to Kegoro, while the initial involvement of the Court in Côte d’Ivoire (and Libya as well) was both appropriate and justifiable – in that it had an immediate effect of publicly championing an end to impunity and the promotion of the rule of law – the true impact of the ICC is at a, “fledgling state”.

Assessing how the ICC intervention has affected the prevention of further atrocities and regional stability and the peace will require on-going monitoring and evaluation, both during ICC trial processes and after the decisions,” Kegoro said. While he noted that prosecution of perpetrators of the most serious crimes can have a deterrent impact, “the societal implications of ICC interventions and decisions is something that will only be shaped and understood over time.”

Kegoro concluded by adding that, “The long-term impact of the ICC, especially on African nations, is something that needs to be carefully assessed,” particularly in the wake of the Court’s involvement and the implementation of RtoP in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.

Peace vs. Justice?

As the ICC was involved in Libya during the conflict, but formally announced its investigation into the situation in Côte d’Ivoire only after hostilities had ceased, debate has arisen over the timeliness of the employment of the ICC as a tool to respond to mass atrocities under the RtoP framework. The debate also touches on a more general discussion of whether justice for victims of atrocity crimes can be pursued while attempting to secure a peaceful resolution to a conflict or vice versa. This is more commonly known as the peace vs. justice debate.

Both Jabati and Pace were unequivocal in stating that there can be no peace in any situation without justice for crimes committed. This idea spurred Jabati’s COJA, along with a number of other civil society organization’s present at the Kampala Review Conference, to push for the ability of the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor to prioritize conflict prevention in Africa through extensive outreach programs, highlighting the importance placed on justice in the pursuit of peace in cost-conflict settings, and in the prevention of violence altogether.

Pace argues against the premise that pursuing peace and accountability for international crimes at the same time doesn’t work, and says that there has been, “no peace strategy that has worked worse” than giving major combatant leaders amnesty and transferring them to a third country with personal and financial security. Instead, the WFM-IGP Executive Director stated that while each individual situation must be evaluated independently, the recent-year examples of Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, the DRC, and Colombia, “make the case that in many conflict situations introducing international criminal justice actually helps achieve and fortify peace.”

But, drawing on the specific example of Kenya, where the ICC opened an investigation on 31 March 2010 and is currently in the process of trying four individuals it has found responsible for the 2007-2008 post-election violence, Kegoro says that the country’s experience points to the fact that the “most practicable time for ICC intervention is in post-conflict situations.

However, according to Kegoro, this was a result of the fact that Kenya had only exhibited its unwillingness to prosecute perpetrators of violence well after it had subsided; thus the ICC had little role to play during the crisis. Therefore, he states that, “there may be a set of circumstances in the future where direct ICC intervention during an armed conflict is appropriate, or even required.”

Also drawing on recent examples, Nkunda sees both positives and negatives of the Court’s involvement during armed hostilities. With the Lubanga case, Nkunda notes that the Court’s engagement during the conflict in the DRC did have a positive impact on limiting crimes, specifically in raising awareness that the practice of conscripting child soldiers was contrary to international law and that such behaviour to could lead to the docket in the Hague.

In terms of negative implications, the IRRI Co-Director points to Sudan as a glaring example, where, “the unintended but expected consequences of the Court’s decision was the expulsion of humanitarian organizations [16 aid agencies operating in Darfur were expelled in early March 2009], which heavily impacted the lives of the very people – the victims – whom the Court was trying to protect.” Furthermore, in singling out individuals as direct perpetrators of the violence, as the ICC did with the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and others in the context of the crisis in Darfur, Nkunda notes that the actions of the Court may have served to insulate one group to become, “more deadly, since they have nothing to lose.”

Our members’ insight, drawn from their experience working in the fields of international law and conflict prevention in unique national and regional contexts, shows that much depends on the complexities of the situation at hand, but that justice should certainly not come at the expense of peace.

Deterrence and the Need for Prevention

Jabati, Kegoro, Nkunda and Pace all touted the deterrent effect of the ICC on would-be violators of Rome Statute provisions, both in conflict and post-conflict settings. At times, however, the ICC itself may not be enough to halt ongoing mass atrocities in specific cases. In both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, a wider array of measures became necessary to protect populations, including the use of force.

The present Syrian crisis, which has claimed as many as 8,000 lives since March 2011, continues unabated as the civilians remain victim to gross human rights violations at the hands of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.  Regional and international actors must uphold their Responsibility to Protect the population of Syria by employing additional measures to effectively end the continued “collective punishment”.

In addition to a range of measures to respond to the crisis, the ICC has emerged as a potential tool to respond to the crisis through the RtoP framework. Calls have been made on a number of occasions by UNHCHR Pillay, as well as by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, and civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, for the Security Council to refer Syria to the ICC. To date, however, there have been no such moves to ensure justice for the victims of the crackdown through the ICC, and the killing has largely continued unabated.

Only when tangible steps are taken to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing from occurring altogether will this cycle of atrocity and reaction be broken.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon put forth two such preventive measures in his January 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, by urging Member States to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to implement national legislation against atrocity crimes.

As the report reads, “The Rome Statute seeks to develop mechanisms and processes for identifying, investigating and prosecuting those most directly responsible for crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protectI would encourage additional States to become parties to the Statute and thus to strengthen one of the key instruments relating to the responsibility to protect.”

But the Secretary-General noted that becoming a Party to the Rome Statute, along with other relevant instruments of international law, is just the first step in the full of the responsibility to protect. Consistent with the emphasis on the primary responsibilities of states by both the RtoP and the ICC, the Secretary-General’s report states that, “these core international standards need to be faithfully embodied in international legislation,” so that impunity for any of the four RtoP crimes is not accepted nationally or globally.

Taking these steps may ensure that states meet their primary responsibilities of protecting civilians by criminalizing the four RtoP crimes under both their domestic laws and their international obligations, and may work to realize their prevention altogether.

Please see the links below for the full statements by our members:

Statement by Sulaiman Jabati, Executive Secretary of Citizens for Justice and Accountability (Freetown, Sierra Leone)

Statement made by George Kegoro, Executive Director of the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (Nairobi, Kenya)

Response by William Pace, Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, Convenor of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), and Co-Founder and Steering Committee Member of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (New York, USA)

Statement by Dismas Nkunda, Co-Director of the International Refugee Rights Initiative (Kampala, Uganda and New York, USA)

Special thanks to George Kegoro, Sulaiman Jabati, Dismas Nkunda, and William Pace. A shorter version of this post was expanded upon for this blog, and will be appearing in the upcoming print edition of World Federalist Movement News.

Editor’s Note: The views expressed in these individual responses prepared by our civil society member organizations do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.

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